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VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennet9
A. C>mzN LAw
Negligent Homicide
In State v. Nix,' attorneys for a defendant who had been found
guilty of negligent homicide and sentenced to one year's imprison-
ment clutched at the proverbial "last straw" and urged that Article
32 of the Criminal Code, which defined the crime of negligent homi-
cide, was unconstitutional. This argument was aimed primarily at
the provision in Article 32 that the violation of any statute or ordi-
nance should be considered as "presumptive evidence of criminal
negligence.". In overruling this contention, the supreme court
stressed the fact that the presumption which arose from the viola-
tion of a statute or ordinance was a rebuttable presumption. As
Justice Hawthorne pointed out, the "presumptive evidence" clause
of Article 32 was inserted to avoid the harsh results of the prior
Louisiana rule that such statutory violations were criminal negli-
gence per se. Also, violation of the statute does not create a pre-
sumption of guilt, but creates only a presumption of criminal negli-
gence which is one element of the crime of negligent homicidejt
does not relieve the state of the burden of proving beyond any rea-
sonable doubt every element of the crime charged, that is, the homi-
cide, criminal negligence of the defendant, and that such negligence
was a proximate cause of the homicide.
The issue of proximate cause in negligent homicide was con-
sidered in State v. Kaufman," a prosecution for negligent homicide
by automobile at a railroad crossing. The defense urged that the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 81 So. (2d) 1 (La. 1947).
2. Article 82 of the Criminal Code states the presumption as follows: "The
violation of a statute or ordinance shall be considered only a romanpt've
evidckwe of such negligence." Defense counsel also challenged Article 82 on the
ground of lack of certainty, urging that it failed to set forth what acts would
be considered criminal thereunder. This argument was held to be without merit,
since the definition of Article 82 is to be contrued in connection with the general
provision of Art. 12 wherein "criminal negligence" Is carefully defined. It is,
of course, impossible to specify or enumerate the multifarious forms which such
criminal negligence may take. It might be in. the use of explosives, the handling
of fire arms, or in the driving of an automobile as in the instant ease.
8. Citing Comment to Article 82 by the draftsmen of the Criminal Code, and
discussingthe rule of State v. Wilkbanks, 168 La. 861, 86, 128 So. 600, 601(1929) wich the phraselogy employed in Article 8 bad sought to avold.
4211 JL 517, 80 S.()8f(10W).
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fatal accident was caused by negligence on the part of those who
were charged with maintaining the crossing and had permitted a
defective condition to exist. This condition, it was claimed, was a
substantial and proximate cause of the fatal accident. In affirming
the defendant's conviction for negligent homicide, the supreme court
held that the defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of
the accident, but it was a proper basis of criminal liability if it
materially concurred with other independent agencies in bringing
about the result. It was sufficient if the defendant's reckless driving
had substantially contributed to producing the injury, and if it was
a materially contributing factor without which the fatal accident
would not have occurred. The existence of the independent con-
curring negligence of those charged with the maintenance of the
highway did not excuse or relieve the driver from liability for the
death which had directly resulted from his criminally negligent
operation of a motor vehicle.
Attempted Homicide-Negligent Homicide
Article 27 of the Criminal Code prescribes criminal liability for
any person who "having a specific intent to commit a crime, does
or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the
accomplishing of his object . . . ," and provides that the penalty
for an attempt shall be one-half of the penalty provided for the
consummated offense. It has naturally followed that a defendant
who fell short in his effort to commit murder was guilty of at-
tempted murder, and that a defendant who attempted to kill another
with such provocation as would have reduced the homicide to man-
slaughter was guilty of attempted manslaughter.5 In these instances,
the defendant fully met the requirements of Article 27 in "having
a specific intent" to kill the victim. In State v. Adams6 the defendant
had been indicted for "attempted murder" and found guilty of
"attempted negligent homicide." Defense counsel moved in arrest
of judgment, urging that "there was not-and in the nature of
things could not be-such a crime as attempted negligent homicide."
In upholding this contention and setting the verdict and sentence
aside, the supreme court very carefully analyzed the crime of negli-
gent homicide which is prescribed in Article 32 of the Criminal
Code as "the killing of a human being by criminal negligence."
The definition of criminal negligence in Article 12 specifically pre-
5. State v. Harper, 205 La. 228, 17 So. (2d) 260 (1944). Conviction of at-
tempted manslaughter under indictment for attempted murder upheld.
6. 210 La. 782, 28 So. (2d) 269 (1946).
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cludes the presence of either a specific or general criminal intent.
Since the crime of negligent homicide bases liability upon gross
negligence or inadvertence, it is a practical and logical impossibility
that a defendant should have a specific intent to commit negligent
homicide, or be guilty of an attempt to commit that crime.
Cruelty to Animals
Article 102 of the Louisiana Criminal Code defines cruelty to
animals as "the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment of
any animal... ." This article is broad enough to include the cruel
or inhuman killing of a dog, regardless of the ownership of the
animal. In State v. Herring7 a defendant, who was charged with
cruelty to animals, in that he had killed a dog belonging to another,
urged as a defense that the dog had not been registered by its owner
and did not wear a license tax tag on its collar at the time it was
killed. In overruling this defense, the supreme court pointed out
that the Registration License Law,8 upon which the defendant relied,
was entirely separate and distinct from Article 102 of the Criminal
Code which was designed to prevent cruelty to all animals regard-
less of the ownership or licensing of such animals. This decision is
readily distinguished from the supreme court's previous holding in
State v. Mores?* that a defendant could not be convicted of simple
criminal damage to property"0 for the killing of a dog which was not
registered and tagged as required by law. The registration statute ex-
pressly authorizes the killing of an unregistered or vicious dog with-
out any civil or criminal liability attaching." Cruelty to animals, the
crime charged in the Herring case, is clearly distinguishable in both
purpose and definition from simple criminal damage to property.
Liability for this crime is dependent upon the cruel and inhuman
manner in which the dog is disposed of and it is immaterial who
owns the dog or whether it bears a tag indicating that the license
tax has been paid.
Keeping a Disorderly Place-Article 104 Declared Unconstitutional
In State v. Truby"2 defendants appealed from a conviction for
keeping a disorderly place. They based their appeal on the claim that
7. 81 So. (2d) 218 (La. 1947). The conviction and sentence were annulled
and set aside because of the insufficiency of the indictment, which neither used
the short form nor sufficiently set out the essential elements of the crime.
8. La. Act 239 of 1918.
9. 209 La. 180, 24 So. (2d) 870 (1945), discussed (1947) 7 LODISIAWA LAw
RxviEw 165, 289.
10. La. Crim. Code, Art. 56.
11. La. Act 239 of 1918, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1989) § 361.]
12. 211 La. 178, 29 So. (2d) 758 (1947).
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Article 104 of the Criminal Code, which defined that offense, was
unconstitutional in that it failed sufficiently to define a crime. Article
104, rather than enumerating the various forms of disorderly con-
duct, had briefly defined the offense as "the intentional maintain-
ing of a place to be used habitually for any illegal or immoral pur-
pose." Defendant contended that the words "illegal" and "immoral"
had no fixed and well defined meanings, leaving it entirely to the
court as to what activity should be deemed criminal.
The supreme court firmly and unequivocally overruled defend-
ant's contention as to the insufficiency of the word "illegal," pointing
out that this word, taken in its usual sense in connection with the
context of the statute, has a definite and fixed meaning, that is, "con-
trary to, or prohibited by, some criminal statute.'
The court, however, sustained the defendant's contention that
the word. "immoral," as used in Article 104, was too vague, indefi-
nite and uncertain to define sufficiently criminal conduct. The
supreme court took the view that immorality was such a varying
concept that it might well "embrace many acts which could not
possibly have any criminal character." According to this thesis if
the phrase "immoral purpose" had been somewhat more limited or
qualified as to its application and scope, it might have received a
more favorable interpretation. In this regard, it is interesting to note
a distinction which the majority opinion recognized between a
statute punishing "lewd dancing," which was held to be sufficient
in the definition of a disorderly house,1' and "lewd or indecent act"
which was held to be too vague and indefinite"1
As a result of the Truby decision, Article 104 is declared partially
invalid and is effective only in making it a crime to maintain a place
to be used habitually for "an illegal purpose." Keeping a disorderly
house for "immoral" purposes will henceforth be prosecuted under
Act 241 of 1942 which also covers this type of anti-social activity.
It may well be argued that the supreme court was unduly tech-
nical in holding that the term "immoral purpose" does not suffi-
ciently define and delimit criminal activity.0 Other criteria of crim-
18. The court relied largely on Its previous holding In State v. Bulot, 175 La.
21, 142 So. 787 (1982), wherein the synonymous word "unlawful" was sufflciently
definite and certain.
14. State v. Rose, 147 La. 248, 84 So. 668 (1920).
15. City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906, 88 So. 186 (1919).
16. For excellent criticisms of the Traby decision see Morrow, The Gener-
ality of "Immorality" In Louisiana (1947) 21 Tulane Law Rev. 545, 549; and
Note (1947) 8 LUIIANA LAw Rinriaw 129.
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inal liability, such as "criminal negligence,""7 which is an essential
element in negligent homicide and negligent injuring, are equally
susceptible of varying interpretations. An examination of decisions
from other jurisdictions shows that the phrase "immoral" is one of
sufficient definiteness and is not susceptible of being used as a drag
net to catch all persons who may be in disfavor with prosecuting
authorities."8 It must be borne in mind that if the word is given an
unduly broad construction, the defendant's right of appeal will pro-
tect from possible persecution. In the Truby case, the bill of indict-
ment stated that defendants maintained their cafe "to be used
habitually as a meeting place for prostitutes and men desirous of
their company.. .," and relators could scarcely argue that such con-
duct, if proved, was non-criminal in nature.
While the writer is not in accord with the supreme court's de-
cision in the Truby case, it would be unfair to overlook the fact that
the decision rendered is upon a close issue with considerable justifica-
tion for the position taken. The language employed in Article 104
was, as the supreme court pointed out, without any qualifying limits
as to the type of immorality condemned. Since opinion differs widely
as to the dividing line between that which is moral and that which
is immoral, the supreme court apparently feared that the statute
would be given widely different interpretations by judges in various
sections of the state. 9
A careful analysis of the supreme court decision does not indi-
cate a general unfavorable attitude towards the use of broad terms,
as distinguished from the old style detailed enumeration method of
defining crimes. Article 104 was held valid insofar as it applied to
the keeping of a place for any "illegal" purpose. The term "illegal,"
although equally as broad as "immoral," was deemed sufficiently
definite to serve as a line of demarcation between criminal and non-
criminal activity. It is also significant that in State v. Pete' the su-
preme court upheld the constitutionality of the important theft
article 1 of the Criminal Code. This article, representing the greatest
17. Criminal negligence is defined in Art. 12 of the Crim. Code as "a gross
deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably
careful man under like circumstances." This conventional test is one which is
sure to vary with the individual judge or jurors' conception of what constitutes
care in the particular situation involved. "Criminal negligence" is well recognized
as a proper basis of criminal liability both in Louisiana and elsewhere.
18. See Note (1947) 8 LoUlSIANA LAw Rlvixw 129, wherein-cases from other
jurisdictions are collected and analyzed.
19. In connection with this consideration, see Morrow, supra note 16, at 556.
20. State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2d) 368 (1944).
21. Art. 67, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
single improvement effected by the Code, had defined theft in broad
but concise language, thus eliminating the technical and obtuse dis-
tinctions between the various stealing crimes and avoiding many
difficulties inherent in seeking to define those crimes by particular-
izing the various ways in which they might be committed. Justice
Fournet's opinion in the Pete case indicated a complete understand-
ing of the purpose and nature of the theft article and of other sim-
ilar definitions in the Criminal Code.
It is sincerely hoped that the decision in the Truby case will not
be permitted to serve as an opening wedge for a type of strict con-
struction which could strike a crippling blow to the Criminal Code.
A brief summary of the history of the preparation of Article 3, the
interpretation article, is appropriate in this regard. Article 3 was
originally prepared and presented to the Council of the Louisiana
State Law Institute with a clause which specifically eliminated the
common law rule that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed.
This draft met strong opposition from some members of the Council
of the Institute who insisted upon a strict construction. After lengthy
debate and consideration, a compromise was arrived at and Article
3 was finally approved, and later adopted, to read that the provisions
of the Code should be given "a genuine construction, according to
the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connec-
tion with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the pro-
vision." Thus, it will be seen that Article 3 provides neither for a
strict nor for a liberal construction, but rather it was intended to pro-
vide that the articles of the Code should be given a logical construc-
tion with reference to the purpose which they sought to achieve.
This logical construction is necessary if the Criminal Code is to have
its purported beneficial effect and conform with the modern legis-
lative trend of defining crimes in general, but in concise and defi-
nite terms, rather than by seeking to enumerate all of the various
and myriad forms which the criminal activity may take. It is the
general issue involved, rather than the particular fate of Article 104,
that makes it important to analyze the Truby decision and to utter
a hopeful prognostication that the decision in that case will not be
carried beyond its facts and used as a basis for an attack on other
articles of the Code where it is clear that the language employed
fully appraises the accused of the line which is drawn between crim-
inal and non-criminal activity.
[Vol. Vill
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Corrupt Influencing
The Criminal Code combined all of the numerous and some-
what confusing bribery statutes in one general article on public
bribery,22 which embraced the bribery of public officials or em-
ployees, election officials, jurors and witnesses.2a Bribery was defined
to include the giving or receiving, and also the promising or solicit-
ing, of a bribe. The intent element of the offense merely required
that the bribe be given or offered "with the intent to influence" the
recipient's official conduct. The action induced necd not be corrupt
or illegal. The special crime of corrupt influencing 4 reaches some-
what further than the public bribery article and punishes the giving
of something of value to, or acceptance of payment by, a third per-
son, to the end that such person will use his influence so as to induce
corruptly action or inaction by those public officials who are enu-
merated in and covered by the public bribery article. In State v.
Williams25 the defendant was charged with having accepted money
and services from negro applicants for Certificates of Public Neces-
sity and Convenience upon the understanding that he would influ-
ence the appropriate employee in the office of the Commissioner of
Public Utilities to issue certificates to them. In affirming the con-
viction, the supreme court held that the defendant's conduct
amounted to corrupt influencing and that it was not necessary that
the specific employee who the defendant had purported to be able
to influence should be named in the indictment or in the evidence.
While the defendant was not a public official, he purported to have
influence with the right people; and had taken advantage of the
gullible negro applicants for certificates, who felt meeting his de-
mands for money and services would insure the receiving of their
certificate regardless of merit. The case was one which nicely illus-
trates the advantage of the special crime of corrupt influencing. It is
interesting to note, as an academic matter, that the applicants for
certificates could also have been prosecuted for corrupt influencing.
However, they were more victims than joint participants and the
practical administration of justice did not particularly point toward
the necessity or propriety of their being prosecuted.
22. Art. 118, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
23. Bribery of voters was made a separate and lesser offense. Id. at Art.
24. Art. 120, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
25. 211 La. 782, 30 So. (2d) 834 (1947).
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B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Peace Bonds
In re Bordclon2" raised a number of questions concerning peace
bond procedure. A ten thousand dollar peace bond had been ordered
by the district judge on the affidavit of four credible persons that
they had just cause to apprehend that a breach of peace and resulting
bodily harm to them was contemplated by relator. Relator's princi-
pal defense, an exception to the jurisdiction of the district court to
require peace bonds, was based upon State v. Restiva,27 a decision
rendered at a time when the constitutional authority of the district
court did not include the jurisdiction to require peace bonds and
such authority was vested solely in justices of the peace. This excep-
tion was properly overruled since Section 35 of Article VII of the
1921 Constitution expressly defines the jurisdiction of the district
courts to include the requiring of "bonds to keep the peace." The
method of procedure in such cases is prescribed in Article 27 of the
1928 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Relator's alternative complaints presented some interesting prob-
lems as to the procedure followed in ordering peace bonds. As his
first alternative complaint, relator urged that the bond was ordered
without a hearing. This, the court agreed, would have been a viola-
tion of the procedure provided in Article 27, but for the fact that the
order further directed the sheriff to bring relator before the court for
a hearing before arresting him. The relator had subsequently ap-
peared and a hearing had been held prior to the signing of the bond.
While the procedure followed in ordering the bond before a hearing
was somewhat irregular, no prejudice had resulted in view of the
actual handling of the case. Relator's second alternative claim, that
he was not confronted with the witnesses against him, was without
merit since he had not denied that the affiants' fears were well
grounded. If there had been a denial, the affiants would have been
obliged to show the cause for their apprehension that a breach of
the peace was intended. A third alternative complaint, that the
amount of the bond was excessive, was rejected on the principal
ground that relator had not objected to the amount of the bond
when it was fixed. The court also pointed out that relator had ex-
perienced no difficulty or delay in raising the bond. The last alterna-
tive claim was partially sustained. The bond was a general order
26. 210 La. 1080, 29 So. (2d) 162 (1946).
27. 149 La. 462, 89 So. 425 (1921).
[Vol. Vill
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requiring the relator to keep the peace as to any person whomsoever,
and especially as to the parties named in the affidavit, for a period of
twelve months. The court sustained the relator's contention that the
bond had exceeded the requirements of the situation, and held that
the bond was unenforceable to the extent that it went beyond the
protection of the four affiants from threatened harm.
Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court
Under Article VII, Sections 52 and 96, of the Louisiana Con-
stitution the juvenile courts are given exclusive original jurisdiction
over children charged with being neglected or delinquent and over
adults charged with contributing to such delinquency. This exclu-
sive juvenile court jurisdiction is also expressly applicable to the case
of any person charged with the violation of a law "enacted for the
protection of the physical, moral or mental well-being of children,-
not punishable by hard labor," and of parents charged with "de-
sertion or non-support of children.""8 Following the unequivocal
mandate of the constitutional provision, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held, in State v. Smith,"' that the prosecution of an adult for
indecent behavior with juveniles" was not triable by the criminal
district court. Likewise, in State v. Kiffe81 the district court was held
to be without jurisdiction to try a defendant under a charge of de-
serting and wilfully neglecting to provide for the support of his wife
and three minor children. The supreme court opinion made it clear,
however, that the regular district court's lack of jurisdiction extended
only to the charge of desertion and non-support of the minor chil-
dren, and- that the defendant was subject to further prosecution'in
that court for desertion and non-support of Vis wife. The setting
aside of the conviction and sentence and dismissal of the proceedings
as to the charge of non-support of the minor children was expressly
declared to be without prejudice to the state's right to proceed for
that offense in the appropriate juvenile court.
It is important to note that had State v. Kiffe been decided in
Orleans Parish, the district court would have been without jurisdic-
tion over the charge of desertion and non-support of the wife, as well
as that of non-support of the minor children. Both issues would be
within the exclusive province of the juvenile court. This would be
28. La. Const. (1921) Art. VII, § 52 (applying generally) and § 96 (apply-
ing to Orleans Parish).
29. 210 La. 581, 591, 27 So. (2d) 859, 863 (1946).
80. Art. 81, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
31. 210 La. 863, 28 So. (2d) 459 (1946).
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by reason of a special provision extending the Orleans Parish Juvenile
Court's jurisdiction "to all cases of desertion or non-support of chil-
dren by either parent, or of non-support of wives by their hus-
bands."82 While convenience might be served by having all claims
against the defendant adjudicated at one hearing in the instant case,
such an extension of the jurisdiction of the Orleans Parish Juvenile
Court to cover non-support of the wife is inconsistent with the nature
and purported jurisdiction of Louisiana Juvenile Courts. In every
other regard, the juvenile court's jurisdiction is limited to cases relat-
ing directly to children under seventeen. The rule as applied in the
Kiffe case, applicable in every parish other than Orleans, is clearly in
harmony with the usual scope of juvenile court jurisdiction. The
special Orleans Parish rule is apparently patterned after the broader
jurisdictional scope of the general domestic relations courts which
are established in some of the larger cities of the nation.
Double Jeopardy
The prohibition against double jeopardy which is found in both
the Louisiana Constitution" and the Code of Criminal Procedure 4
is based upon the obviously just principle that no person shall be
tried twice for the same offense. This rule does not apply, however,
where two entirely separate and distinct crimes arise out of a single
transaction. For example, a defendant may break into a house with
intent to steal or to commit rape, and commit the intended crime
after entering. In such case, he would be guilty of burglary, and
would also be guilty of the separate and distinct crime of theft or
rape, as the case might be. It should be noted that in this case, while
the criminal intent for both crimes coincides, the burglary is com-
mitted by the act ofrentering and the rape or theft is committed by
what is done after entering. It is important to distinguish the some-
what similar, but not analogous, situation where a single set of facts
results in criminal liability under two different statutes or articles of
the Criminal Code. In such case, Article 4 of the Criminal Code ex-
pressly provides that the prosecution may proceed under "either
provision." For example, a defendant who obtained money or prop-
erty by a bad check could be prosecuted either for theft under Ar-
ticle 67 or for issuing worthless checks under Article 71. A defena-
ant who attacked a girl with an intent to commit rape could be
prosecuted for attempted aggravated rape under Articles 27 and L4z,
32. La. Const. (1921) Art. I, § 96.
33. Id. at § 9.
34. Art. 274, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
[Vol. Vill
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or for simple battery under Article 35, but not both. Similarly, a de-
fendant who shoots another with intent to kill could be prosecuted
either for attempted murder under Articles 27 and 30, or for aggra-
vated battery under Article 34. This type of situation was presented
in the recent case of State v. Mitchell.5 The defendant, who had
struck a sixteen year old youth with his fist, was properly subject to
prosecution for the offense of simple battery or simple assault under
Articles 35 and 38 of the Criminal Code, or for cruelty to juveniles
under Article 93. He had been tried, convicted, and sentenced for the
offense of simple assault. Subsequently, when a charge of cruelty to
juveniles was predicated upon the same attack upon the boy, a plea
of former jeopardy was entered. The juvenile judge overruled the
special plea and adjudged the defendant guilty, whereupon an appeal
was taken. Apparently, defense counsel later abandoned the appeal
for, when the case was called for a hearing, no oral argument or
brief was presented. As a result, the supreme court made only a very
cursory examination of the question and upheld the trial judge's
ruling. It is submitted that if the matter had been properly presented
and argued, the appellant's plea of former jeopardy should have
been sustained. For all that appears in the record, the defendant had
committed a single crime in his attack upon the juvenile. While this
criminal action might be prosecuted as a simple assault or battery,
or might be prosecuted as cruelty to juveniles, it is not logical to
conclude that both prosecutions should be allowed. The state had a
choice between crimes but not a privilege of double prosecution.
Continuance
The granting or refusing of a continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.3 Where a continuance is requested in
order to afford counsel additional time to prepare for trial, very ex-
ceptional circumstances must be presented before the supreme court
will hold that the trial court's refusal is an abuse of discretion. Where
the continuance is sought in order to secure the presence of witnesses,
the application must show the nature and importance of the absent
witnesses' testimony, and must show that the failure to have the
witnesses presently available did not result from a lack of due dili-
gence.37 In State v. Kaufmany8 a prosecution for negligent homicide
by an automobile at a railroad crossing, defense counsel moved for
35. 210 La. 1078, 29 So. (2d) 162 (1946).
36. Art. 320, La. Code of Crim. Proe. of 1928.
37. Id. at Art. 322.
38. 211 La. 517, 30 So. (2d) 337 (1947).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
continuance alleging that a defect in the crossing had been discovered
on the day before the trial. The motion did not sufficiently explain
the reason for the delay in discovering this fact, nor the nature and
materiality of the testimony which would be made available through
a continuance. In upholding the trial judge's refusal to grant a con-
tinuance the supreme court emphasized the extent of the trial judge's
discretiojn in this matter and pointed out that the circumstances were
not exceptional enough, nor the necessity for the continuance suffi-
ciently established, to rule that the trial judge had abused his dis-
cretion.
The Indictment - Necessary Averments
The short form indictment prescribed by Article 235 of the Code
of Criminal Procedures is now available for charging all crimes in-
cluded in the Criminal Code of 1942. In State v.-Pullin0 an informa-
tion which fully complied with the abbreviated requirements of Ar-
ticle 235 and declared that the defendant "committed a battery upon
Leslie Cowley with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a pistol," was held
to constitute a sufficient charge of aggravated battery, and it was not
necessary that the word "aggravated" be used to characterize the
offemse. 4' Similarly, a short form charge of negligent homicide was
upheld, without any discussion of the issue being deemed necessary,
in State v. Nix.42 In State v. Herring3 the prosecution failed to use
the short form and an affidavit that defendant "unlawfully and un-
necessarily did cruelly kill a domestic animal, to-wit a dog" was
held insufficient, in failing to charge "intentional or criminally neg-
ligent mistreatment" within the requirements of the cruelty to ani-
mals article of the Criminal Code."' This decision is a practical
illustration of the advantage and desirability of the short form.
Only the long form indictment is available, however, for charg-
ing those special crimes which are not included in the Criminal
Code. In such cases the indictment must state every fact and circum-
stance necessary to constitute the offense. In State v. Waits the
39. As amended by La. Act 223 of 1944. For a discussion of the purpose and
constitutionality of the short form Indictment see Comments (1944) 6 LoVUsIA A
LAW IIEVirw 78, and (1945) 6 LOriSlAXA LAw Rzmvzw 461.
40. 210 La. 918, 28 So. (2d) 609 (1946).
41. Accord: State v. Young, 206 La. 202, 19 So. (2d) 48 (1944). Cf. State
v. Reynolds, 209 La. 455, 24 So. (2d) 818 (1945) where a short form Information
for aggravated battery was rendered fatally defective by Its failure to name the
person upon whom the battery was committed.
42. 31 So. (2d) 1, 6 (La. 1947).
43. Note 7, supra.
44. Art. 102, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
45. 210 La. 769, 28 So. (2d) 265 (1946).
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defendants had been tried and convicted of selling alcoholic liquor
on Sundays in violation of a local police jury ordinance. The bills
of information upon which they were tried were fatally defective in
that they failed to charge that the selling or serving of the intoxicating
liquor was done "in or about any tavern, house of public entertain-
ment, or a shop for retailing liquors." In accord with a well settled
principal of Louisiana jurisprudence," that where the indictment
is substantially defective in failing to state every essential element of
the crime the nullity may be complained of after conviction by way
of a motion in arrest of judgment, the convictions and sentences
were set aside.
In State v. Pettifield47 the necessary allegations were not so
clearly ascertainable. Pettifield had been convicted on an information
charging him with having "unlawfully failed to send his child to
school, in violation of Act No. 239 of 1944." In sustaining a motion
in 'arrest of judgment and setting the conviction aside, the supreme
court held that the information was insufficient to charge a crime in
that "it merely states a conclusion of law without detailing the facts
and circumstances upon which such conclusion is based."4 Justice
Fournet, who delivered the majority opinion declared, that "an ac-
cusation to be valid must show that the defendant unjustifiably
failed to send the subject child to school, giving his or her name and
age and the dates of such absences. These allegations, we think, are
sacramental and necessary for a valid accusation." In this regard,
Justice Hawthorne, whd dissented, declared that a specific allega-
tion that the defendant's failure to send his child to school "was
unjustified" was not necessary for a valid information. In so arguing,
Justice Hawthorne relied upon the express provision of Article 228
of the Code of Criminal Procedure that matters coming in by way
of proviso or exception in a criminal statute need not be included
in the indictment, but must be urged by way of defense. Article 228
is clearly applicable to cases where the statutory exception follows
the usual pattern of making the act criminal "except where -,"
adds "provided that this law shall not apply where -," or states
that the prescribed conduct is a crime "otherwise than when -. " In
such cases it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso appears
46. State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1984). State v. Pridgen,
187 La. 569, 175 So. 63 (1987), where the indictment failed to charge that the
sale was "for beverage purposes."
47. 210 La. 609, 27 So. (2d) 424 (1946).
48. 210 La. 609, 620, 27 So. (2d) 424, 427, the court relied upon the general
requirement of Art. 227 of the Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 that "The indictment
must state every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense . . . "
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in the so called "enacting clause" or in the "definition of the
crime."4 An issue of considerable difficulty is presented in the inter-
pretation of statutes stich as the compulsory school attendance law.
Section 1 of that statute makes it a crime to fail to send a child be-
tween the ages of seven and sixteen years to school. Section 3 sets
out those cases where children are exempt from the provisions of
the act. A careful reading of the statute would indicate that the
exemptions listed in Section 3 come within the meaning of Article
228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the essential ele-
ments of the crime are that the defendant has control or charge of a
child between the age of seven and seventeen (stating the name and
age of the child) and the facts establishing such absences from school
as to constitute a non-compliance with the law. In the principal case
the indictment failed to include these essential averments and was
properly characterized by the majority opinion as "a mere conclu-
sion of law." However, the majority opinion appears to have gone
too far, in view of the language of Article 228, in requiring that the
indictment show that the failure to send the child to school was
"unjustifiable." It would logically appear that the matters of justifi-
cation set out in Section 3 of the act need not be negatived in the
indictment, and should be urged by way of defense. The complete
failure of the information to set out the essential elements of crim-
inal liability is ample reason for setting the conviction and sentence
aside; and it may be that the additional statement that the informa-
tion must charge "that the defendant unjustifiably failed to send the
subject child to school" will not be adhered to in subsequent cases.
Further application of such a requirement might well result in an
artificial and unnatural limitation upon the simple and liberal rule
which Article 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks to
enunciate.
Bill of Particulars - Nature and Effect
In State v. Pettifield ° the district attorney argued that the other-
wise insufficient indictment had been amplified and validated by the
bill of particulars which gave the name and age of the child and the
dates of his failure to attend school. The majority opinion rejected
this argument, relying on the supreme court's recent decision in
State v. Bienvenu"' where it had held that the bill of particulars can-
not in any way aid an indictment or information which is funda-
49. See Note (1941) 3 LouiSIANA LAw REVTXW 454.
50. Note 46, supra.
51. 207 La. 859, 22 So. (2d) 196, 198 (1945).
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mentally bad. The defendant is prosecuted solely upon the indict-
ment, which must sufficiently set out the crime charged. A bill of
particulars is not a part of the indictment and merely serves to pro-
vide the defense with detailed advance information as to the specific
way the state intends to prove that the crime was committed. A
contrary statement by Justice Hamiter in State v. Davis2 provided
some support and solace for Justice Hawthorne who reiterated his
previous contention that the bill of particulars may be considered as
amplifying inadequate averments of the indictment. It is significant,
however, that Justice Hamiter's statement in the Davis case was
strictly of the make-weight variety.53 Thus, it was not seriously con-
sidered by the majority opinion, which logically followed and ap-
plied the rule of State v. Bienvenu as to the proper nature and effect
of a bill of particulars.
In line with its consistent rulings that the bill of particulars does
not constitute a part of the indictment or formal charge, the supreme
court held in State v. Smith54 that the crime charged in the indict-
ment could not be altered by the bill of particulars. The defendants
had been charged with theft. In answer to a motion requesting de-
tailed information concerning the manner in which the theft was
supposed to have been committed and as to the part supposed to
have been played by each of the defendants, the district attorney
had filed a bill of particulars pointing out that the four defendants
had entered into a conspiracy to commit theft by means of fraudu-
lent conduct and representations and further elaborating upon the
part which each defendant played in the commission of the crime.
The supreme court appropriately held that the bill of particulars did
not change the crime charged from theft to a conspiracy to commit
theft. As a matter of fact, there was nothing inconsistent between
the bill of particulars and the original charge, for there had been no
abandonment of the allegation that the defendants actually com-
mitted the crime of theft in the furtherance of their conspiracy.
52. 208 La. 954, 23 So. (2d) 801 (1945), wherein Justice Hamiter declared,
in upholding a short form indictment for gambling, that if the indictment were
deficient, such deficiency was cured by the bill of particulars. Accord: State v.
Varnado, 208 La. 819, 384, 23 So. (2d) 106, 128 (1945).
53. In discussing Justice Hamiter's statement (1947) 7 LouIsIANA LAW RE-
VIEw 297, 298, this writer pointed out that a careful reading of Justice Hamiter's
opinion indicated a definite holding that the short form gambling indictment was,
by itself, sufficient to charge the crime; and that this statement concerning the
bill of particulars as supplementary to the indictment was not entitled to very
much weight.
51. 210 La. 891, 28 So. (2d) 487 (1946).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Jury List- Duties of Trial Judge
While the Code of Criminal Procedure does not specifically
charge the district judge with the duty of supervising the jury com-
mission's work in preparing the jury venire and jury lists, it is cer-
tainly a proper function of the conscientious district judge to set
aside, ex proprio motu, the general venire and jury lists when those
lists and the jury commission's proceedings are patently irregular
and insufficient. In State v. McLean 5 the presiding district judge
had discovered that the envelope labeled "list of grand jurors,"
which is supposed to contain slips with twenty names, did not con-
tain a single name. Other possible serious irregularities in the jury
commission's proceedings were also discovered. Thereupon the court
set aside the jury venire and jury lists, as well as the entire proceed-
ings of the jury commission, and ordered a new meeting of the jury
commission for the purpose of drawing a venire and selecting proper
grand jury and tales jury lists. It was the contention of the defend-
ant that the trial judge had erred in setting aside the original pro-
ceedings-of the jury commission since there was no showing that
fraud had been committed in those proceedings." In overruling
defense counsel's objection, the supreme court stressed the duty of
the trial judge to make sure that the general venire and jury lists
were properly drawn and selected, and thus to avoid the delay which
would result if the indictment or jury panel were set aside after the
trial commenced. There was no evidence that the defendant had
been prejudiced by the trial judge's action. This finding was bol-
stered by the fact that defense counsel had only used nine of twelve
permissible peremptory challenges, thus evidencing satisfaction with
the jury selected. 7
Jury - Exclusion of Negroes
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, since the holding in Pierre
v. State of Louisiana"5 that a systematd exclusion of negroes from
the jury venire and jury lists constitutes a denial of due process and
equal protection of the law, have conscientiously sought to indicate
the line between compliance and non-compliance with this man-
.35. 211 La. 413, 80 So. (2d) 187 (1947).
56. Apparently, although Art. 203 of the Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 was
not cited in the supreme court's opinion defense counsel was analogizing from
the provision in Art. 203 that the jury venire cannot be challenged because of
irreguhrities of the jury commission "unless some fraud has been practiced or
some great wrong committed."
57. This point was stressed by the court, 80 So. (2d) 187, 190.
58. 306 U. S. 354., 59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1989). See Note (1989) 1
L OUANA LAW REvIzw 841, re subsequent hearing.
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date." The issue of discrimination was most recently considered in
State v. Perkins"0 where the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the
aggravated rape conviction of a negro defendant, despite. the appel-
lant's contention that the general venire list contained the names of
only five negroes and had been selected from the roll of registered
voters which included only a very small percentage of the negro
population. While this would appear, on its face, to come very close
to the line of systematic exclusion, it is important to remember that
population percentages do not always serve as an accurate guide to
the number of negroes qualified and available for jury service. The
facts, that one negro had served on the grand jury which had re-
turned the indictment and that one had been included on the petit
jury panel although he did not actually serve on the jury, served to
refute the claim of "systematic exclusion."
In State v. Rankins"t defense counsel's motion to quash the in-
dictment, on the ground that no negroes served on the grand jury
which indicted the colored defendant, was overruled as coming too
late when urged by a motion in arrest of judgment.'2 Even if the
objection had been timely urged, the mere fact that no negro served
on the grand jury which returned the indictment would not, per se,
establish racial discrimination. 8
Isolation of Jury - Attending Motion Picture Show
Article 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that "the
jurors shall be kept together under the charge of an officer in such
a way as to be secluded from all outside communication." This pro-
vision is predicated upon the sound principle that the jurors should
be completely protected against any possibility of attempts which
might be made to unduly influence them. Thus, in State v. Walters,"
a protracted trial for kidnapping, the court held that the jury had
been improperly separated when they were distributed in three ad-
joining but clearly separated suites of hotel rooms. It did not cure
the irregularity that the entrances to all rooms were in the sight and
59. State v. Anderson, 206 La. 986, 20 So. (2d) 288 (1944); State v. Dorsey,
207 La. 928, 22 So. (2d) 278 (1945), discussed In Symposium, The Work of
Louisiana Supreme Court (1946) 6 LOv1X1AxA LAw Rxviuw 521, 660-668.
60. 31 So. (2d) 188 (La. 1947).
61. 211 La. 791, 80 So. (2d) 887 (1947).
62. The court relied upon State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 14 So. (2d) 873 (1948).
63. In State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. (2d) 278 (1945), Justice Haw-
thorne carefully explained and enunciated the rule that due process and equal
protection do not mean that a colored defendant has an absolute right to have a
jury composed in part of members of his race.
64. 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914).
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hearing of a deputy sheriff who slept in the hall in front of the
rooms and that the evidence of the case revealed no possibility of
outside communication with the jurors. An entirely different atti-
tude was manifested in the recent decision of State v. Ledet.65 In that
case, the jurors, who were serving upon a murder trial, had been
permitted to attend a local picture show. While the seats imme-
diately in front and immediately behind the jurors were occupied
by other persons, the jurors were kept together and there was no
showing of any attempt to communicate with them. In upholding
the conviction the supreme court stressed the fact that no evidence
of misconduct had been submitted, and generalized that "the rule
requiring the isolation of a jury against improper influences does not
appear to preclude the allowance of recreation and exercise to the
jury." 6 In so holding, the supreme court relied upon an earlier de-
cision in State v. Clary67 where it had refused to disturb a man-
slaughter verdict despite the fact that the jury had attended two
picture shows under circumstances similar to those involved in the
instant case. The Clary decision, however, is distinguishable by the
fact that defense counsel had immediate knowledge of the irregu-
larities in question, but failed to raise his objection until after ver-
dict. Such a tardy objection was not entitled to serious consideration.
In the Ledet case, the defendant's motion for a new trial specifically
alleged, and the point was apparently uncontroverted, that the pic-
ture show party "did not come to his knowledge until after the ver-
dict was rendered." Under such circumstances defense counsel were
guilty of no laches. Specific evidence of jury tampering is almost
impossible of proof, and the jury irregularity presented a sufficient
opportunity for undue influencing to bring the case within the in-
tendment of Article 394 and necessitate the setting aside of the con-
viction and sentence. It is because of the possibility of improper in-
fluencing, which cannot be proved by specific evidence, that the rule
requiring strict isolation of jurors has been adopted.
Erroneous Verdicts
Minor irregularities in the phraseology or spelling of the jury's
written verdict do not result in invalidity. This generalization is
predicated on the fact that the Code of Criminal Procedure recog-
nizes the validity of an oral verdict,68 and further provides for the
65. 211 La. 769, 30 So. (2d) 830 (1947).
66. 30 So. (2d) 830, 833.
67. 136 La. 589, 67 So. 376 (1915).
68. Art. 400, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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polling of the jury where the verdict is delivered in writing." In
State P. McLean7" the supreme court affirmed a conviction and sen-
tence for negligent homicide which was based upon a written verdict
of the jury reading, "we the jury find the defendant guilty of Neg.
Homicide." Defense counsel's argument that this verdict did not find
the defendant guilty of any crime under the laws of the state, was
overruled by the supreme court which pointed out that it was ob-
vious that the jury had intended to find the defendant guilty of
"Negligent Homicide." Any doubt which might have been raised
by the abbreviation of the word "negligent" was completely elim-
inated by the polling of the jury. The full verdict had been read
without abbreviation and the requisite number of jurors had af-
firmed the verdict. This holding was further substantiated by con-
struing the verdict in the light of the trial judge's charge, wherein
he had informed the jury that "guilty of negligent homicide" was
one of the verdicts responsive to the charge of manslaughter. In so
holding, the supreme court followed a line of previous decisions
where irregularities in the phraseology or spelling had not been
deemed sufficient to vitiate a verdict and defeat the obvious intend-
ment of the jury. The jury's written verdict, aided by a verbal poll-
ing of the jury wherein the crime was accurately stated, had been
upheld where the verdict read "gulty withoit capitel purnish,"' and
where it read "guilty with and assault by sutinge with intent to mur-
der."72 In affirming a conviction where the verdict read "guilty of
mansluder," the supreme court had declared that the foreman of the
jury "evidently was not sufficiently educated in the orthography of
law terms to write the word 'manslaughter' correctly, but he wrote
it in such a manner as to make the verdict fully intelligible and a
sufficient basis for record and judgment.""s In deciding the McLean
case, the supreme court distinguished its recent decision in State v.
Gueringer," wherein it had held that a verdict of "neglible homi-
cide" was not a valid verdict for the crime of negligent homicide. At
first blush, it would appear that the verdict in the Gueringer case
was very similar to those imperfectly spelled verdicts which had
been upheld in previous decisions. However, as was pointed out in
that case, the jury had not been polled in such a manner as to cure
69. Id. at Arts. 401, 416, 417.
70. 210 La. 413, 80 So. (2d) 187 (1947).
71. State v. Ross, 32 La. Ann. 854 (1880).
72. State v. Wilson, 40 La. Ann. 751, 5 So. 52 (1888). It was obvious from
the indictment, the charge to the jury, and the reading of the verdict, that the
word "sutinge" was intended for "shooting."
73. State v. Smith, 83 La. Ann. 1414 (1881).
74. 209 La. 118, 24 So. (2d) 284 (1945).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the imperfection in the verdict. Apparently, the jury had intended a
verdict of "negligible homicide." Since the word "negligible" and
the proper adjective "negligent" have entirely different meanings,
the jury's intended verdict had failed to include a word which was
essential to a proper characterization of the crime. Any possible fears
that the Gueringer decision might be the beginning of a swing
toward a technical attitude concerning imperfections in the phrase-
ology or spelling of verdicts is completely dispelled by the court's
holding in State v. McLean. In that decision, the court adheres to and
reiterates the practical and liberal policy of its former decisions.
Verdicts - Implied Acquittal
It is well settled that a responsive verdict of guilty of one of the
lesser and included degrees of the crime charged operates as an
implied acquittal of the greater crime. In State v. Adams75 the de-
fendant had been charged with "attempted murder" and a verdict
of what purported to be a lesser degree of that crime, that is, "at-
tempted negligent homicide," had been returned. While the supreme
court held that "attempted negligent homicide" would not support a
sentence, since it purported to convict the defendant of a non-
existent crime, they treated the verdict as valid and binding insofar
as it acquitted the defendant of the crime charged, attempted mur-
der, and of the included crime of attempted manslaughter. In seek-
ing to find the defendant guilty of "attempted negligent homicide,"
the jury had impliedly held that he was not guilty of attempting to
commit the more serious crimes of murder or manslaughter. In a
way, the defendant was permitted to "eat his cake and have it too."
He took advantage of the jury's confusion, and the resulting irreg-
ularity of its verdict, to set aside the sentence imposed under the
verdict. At the same time, he relied upon that verdict and was given
full protection of the implied acquittal of "attempted murder" and
"attempted manslaughter" which were the only charges which the
jury could legally have found against him.
While the result in the Adams case appears somewhat anom-
alous as a practical matter, it is not without precedent in Louisiana
jurisprudence. In State v. Pace'" a defendant had been charged with
robbery and found "guilty of larceny." The verdict was set aside
because of its failure to specify the amount stolen and thus designate
the grade of larceny committed, but the court pointed out that the
75. 210 La. 782, 28 So. (2d) 269 (1946).
76. 174 La. 295, 140 So. 482 (1932).
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implied acquittal of the greater offense of robbery was not to be
affected by the reversal. Justice Land dissented in the Pace case on
the ground that since the verdict was not in such form as to be the
basis of a valid judgment, it should be treated as entirely without
legal effect."" It would appear that both practicality and logic sup-
ports Justice Land's dissent in the Pace case. Possibly, the prevailing
view is influenced by the fact that the trial judge should have refused
to receive a patently improper verdict; and that the defendant is,
therefore, to be permitted to make the most of the judicial oversight.
Suspended Sentence
The power of the sentencing judge to amend or change the sen-
tence cannot be exercised after "the beginning of the execution of
the sentence.""8 However, the judge's power to suspend sentence
during his "good behavior" in a misdemeanor case is not thus lim-
ited, and sentence may be suspended although the prisoner has
actually begun to serve the sentence imposed. 9 This provision for
subsequent suspension of sentence serves a very practical purpose
in cases where the misdemeanant's health or the financial necessi-
ties of his family make his immediate release imperative or ad-
visable. Such a situation was presented in Cox v. Brown."0 The
defendant, who was serving a ninety day sentence, suffered a severe
attack of hemorrhoids necessitating an operation. Upon being ad-
vised of this emergency, the district judge gave credit for the time
already served and declared that "forty days of said ninety day sen-
tence is now suspended upon the good behavior of defendant." After
the termination of the forty day suspended sentence term, the de-
fendant was permitted to remain at home, while undergoing treat-
ment, for thirty more days. Upon his complete convalescence, the
district attorney was willing to grant credit on the ninety day sen-
tence as follows: ten days in jail; eleven days granted by the court
for time spent in the hospital; forty days of suspended sentence
time -making a total of sixty-one days, and leaving deficit of
twenty-nine days yet to be served in jail. The Louisiana Supreme
Court took the view, that the suspension of sentence was authorized,
but that the attempt to limit the suspension to a period of forty days
17. Justice Land relied on Art. 279, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, which
sets out the essential elements of former jeopardy and Includes therein the re-
quirement that "the former verdict rendered was responsive to some charge con-
tained in the indictment and was of such form as to be the basis of a valid
judgment . .
78. Art. 526, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
79. Id. at Art. 586.
80. 211 La. 235, 29 So. (2d) 776 (1947).
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was void. As a result, the defendant was given credit for the entire
time of his convalescence (seventy days), thus making a total of
ninety-one days and fully satisfying the requirements of the sen-
tence. The net result of the decision in the principal case is that
whenever sentence is suspended, such suspension necessarily operates
for the entire term, and any attempted limitation will be a nullity.
As a practical matter, partial suspension of sentence might often
serve a very proper purpose. The supreme court's decision is, how-
ever, a logical interpretation of the language employed in the sus-
pended sentence provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and
any possible objections to the result are scarcely sufficient to justify
an amendment by the legislature. In any event, the decision estab-
lishes an important limitation on the trial judge's power to suspend
sentence to conform with the exigencies of a particular case.
Appeal d- Insufficiency of Evidence
Louisiana has consistently recognized the distinction between
insufficiency of evidence and a total lack of evidence upon an es-
sential element of criminal liability.8 Where the motion for a new
trial is based upon insufficiency of evidence the issue is a factual one
and the trial judge's ruling is not reviewable by the supreme court.82
On the other hand, where there was no evidence to establish an es-
sential element of criminal liability the trial judge commits an error
of law in not granting a new trial.83 In State v. Cortez 4 the defend-
ant was convicted and sentenced for the possession of marijuana
cigarettes. His motion for a new trial, based on the contention that
the state had introduced no evidence to prove actual possession of
the cigarettes, was overruled by the trial judge and an appeal was
taken. In upholding the conviction, Justice Fournet, speaking for
the court, refused to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence and
stressed the fact that the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction in
criminal cases was limited to "questions of law alone." He did point
out, however, that if there was "no evidence at all on some essential
element of the crime charged" the supreme court might set the ver-
dict aside. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented, arguing that there was
"absolutely no proof or evidence" that the defendant had marijuana
cigarettes in his possession. In brief, the entire court was in agree-
81. See discussion of recent cases, Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1945-1946 Term (1947) 7 LoUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 165, 814.
82. State v. Rachal, 211 La. 227, 29 So. (2d) 774 (1947); State v. Hall, 209
La. 950, 25 So. (2d) 908 (1906) discussed in (1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
315 (see note 1, supra).
88. State v. Martinez, 201 La. 949, 10 So. (2d) 712 (1942).
84. 211 La. 669, 80 So. (2d) 681 (1947).
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ment as to the proper rule of appellate jurisdiction, but differed as
to its application to the instant case.
Appeal - Conviction of Adults in Orleans Juvenile Parish Court
The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in criminal cases
is limited to the correction of errors of law.85 This limitation is predi-
cated upon the generally accepted philosophy that the judge or jury
hearing the case should be the final arbiter of issues of fact relat-
ing to guilt or innocence. The decision in State v. Williams" would
appear, at first blush, to be a somewhat surprising one. In that case,
the supreme court, after a thorough review of the testimony, con-
cluded that the state had failed to establish "beyond a reasonable
doubt" one of the elements of the crime of cruelty to juveniles,87 and
therefore reversed the conviction and sentence of six months im-
prisonment. This decision was based upon a 1944 amendment of the
Louisiana Constitution whereby the supreme court's appellate juris-
diction from Orleans Parish Juvenile Court judgments is extended
to questions of both law and fact.8 It is significant to note that the
same adult offender, if tried for a crime not affecting juveniles in
the criminal district court, or if tried in any other parish than Or-
leans, would be entitled to an appeal only on questions of law, and
then only if the penalty actually imposed exceeded six months. In
this regard, one may question the soundness of the constitutional
exception which enlarges the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction
in favor of adult offenders who commit their crimes against ju-
veniles, and in the Parish of Orleans.89
Capital Punishment - Effect of Failure of Electric Chair
In State ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, ° the relator had been con-
victed of murder and sentenced to capital punishment. The death
warrant directed the sheriff to execute the sentence by electrocution
in conformity with the law. Due to a mechanical failure of the elec-
85. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
86. 210 La. 866, 28 So. (2d) 460 (1946).
87. Art. 93, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
88. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 96, as amended by La. Act 322 of 1944.
89. In State v. Smith, 210 La. 581, 591, 27 So. (2d) 859, 862 (1946), the
supreme court reversed a conviction of indecent behavior with juveniles. In so
doing, Chief Justice O'Niell very aptly remarked: "It may seem strange also that
if this case bad been tried originally in the Criminal District Court the defendant
would have had no right of appeal to the Supreme Court even on questions of
law because the penalty actually imposed is neither a fine exceeding $800 nor
imprisonment for a term exceeding six months."
90. 81 So. (2d) 697 (La. 1947).
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tric chair, the first attempt to execute the sentence proved ineffective,
whereupon counsel for the relator applied for writs of habeas corpus.
It was not contended that there had been any irregularity in the
indictment, trial, conviction or sentence. The petition was based pri-
marily upon the ingenuous argument that the first attempted electro-
cution had subjected the relator to such mental pain and suffering
that any further electrocution would constitute "cruel and unusual
punishment" in violation of Article 1, Section 12, of the State Con-
stitution. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused the writ, adopting
the very practical view that the relator had been sentenced to death
after a regular trial, such sentence had not been carried out, and the
authority to pardon the relator or commute his sentence was vested
in the executive rather than the judicial branch of our government.
It appears to the writer that the Louisiana Supreme Court rul-
ing is a very logical one. It would certainly be stretching the pro-
hibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" beyond its original
purpose and scope to use it as a device whereby a murderer who has
been convicted and sentenced to death would be freed from his
proper punishment by reason of the fact that the prompt execution
of the sentence was interrupted by means beyond the control of the
state. The decision would not merit further discussion, but for the
fact that an appeal to the United States Supreme Court resulted in
a very begrudging affirmation of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
view."' Mr. Justice Frankfurter who concurred in the majority opin-
ion expressed a strong "personal feeling of revulsion against a state's
insistence on its pound of flesh." Mr. Justice Burton wrote a vigorous
dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justices Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge, wherein he argued that any further application of elec-
trical current to the body of the relator constituted a cruel and bar-
barous method of punishment. While admitting that the original
failure of the electric chair had been unintentional, Mr. Justice
Burton sought to illustrate the alleged barbarous nature of a sub-
sequent electrocution by citing a hypothetical case where the electro-
cution would be effected by numerous applications, as many as five,
of electrical current. Such a hypothetical illustration is hardly fair.
When we analyze the facts of the case, they boil down to this: De-
fendant has been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a
proceedings which has been entirely regular from beginning to end.
A bona fide and sincere effort was made to carry out the death sen-
tence as expeditously and painlessly as possible. However the elcc-
91. 67 S. Ct. 874 (U. S. 1947).
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tric chair failed to function, and the sentence must now be carried
out by the application of electric current in a chair which is not
mechanically defective. To say that this is "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment," or that it is insisting on the proverbial "pound of flesh"
is to lose sight entirely of the proper nature and functioning of our
rules of criminal law and procedure. If capital punishment is bar-
baric, that is a matter for legislative remedy. If capital punishment is
a sound method of protecting society, a duly convicted murderer
should not be relieved by a distortion of the prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishment."
